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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I will try and draw some lessons for other countries from the experiences of
railway reforms in Great Britain.  In so doing, I will try and update the story in Changing
Trains (Van de Velde, 1999, with a chapter on Great Britain by Root and Preston).  I
should start off with three important caveats.  First, countries are different.  In the project
that led to the book Changing Trains, we tried to look at countries (or parts of countries)
which were similar to The Netherlands.  We concluded that there were no countries in the
world similar to The Netherlands.  We could equally have concluded that there are no
countries similar to Great Britain.   We could draw the same conclusion for Denmark.
Secondly, what I am going to present is a personal, subjective view - some of which is
backed up by empirical evidence, but some of which isn’t. What I want to do then is
draw, somewhat randomly, 20 lessons from the British experience. I have been asked by
the conference organisers to particularly try and present information on the degree of
passenger satisfaction, the extent of ticket system co-ordination and the levels of
investment.  Thirdly, much of what I wish to say I have already said at the International
Conference on Regulatory Reforms in the Railway Sector in Stockholm in July 1999.
Apologies if you have heard this before.
1. The railway reform process is only at the half way stage. The reforms of the railways
were legislated for by the 1993 Railways Act.  The state owned British Railways was
restructured into one track authority (Railtrack), three rolling stock leasing companies
(ROSCOs), 25 passenger train operating companies (TOCs), seven freight train
operating units and some 70 ancillary businesses beginning to trade as free standing
units on 1 April 1994.  The first private passenger TOCs began operating in February
1996, with the franchising completed by March 1997.  Railtrack was privatised
through a stock market flotation in the spring of 1996.  However, the TOCs have long
leases with the ROSCOs which do not come up for renewal until around 2003.
Similarly, Railtrack has long term contracts with the Infrastructure Supply Companies
(ISCOs) that will be renewed around 2003.  2003 is also the year in which the first
tranche of franchises will come up for renewal.
Moreover, the reforms are ongoing (see, for example, DETR, 1998). In July 1999, the
Shadow Strategic Rail Authority (SSRA) was established which brought together the
residual British Railways Board (BRB), the rail freight functions of the Department
of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) and the customer protection role
of the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR) with the functions of the Office of
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1993 Act.  A new Railway Act is expected in the next session of parliament
(1999/2000) which will give the SSRA its own legal powers (and allow the word
Shadow to be dropped).
2. On-the- track competition has been limited, but has been important where permitted.
Up until September 1999, competition was limited to services that competed prior to
the reforms and services that constitute less than 0.2% of a TOCs revenue.  In
September 1999, these limits will be increased to 20%, whilst it is still provisionally
planned to introduce full open access competition in 2002.  Nonetheless, there has
been some significant competition, most notably between Virgin West Coast and
Chiltern between London and Birmingham; National Express’s Gatwick Express,
Connex South Central and GOVIA’s Thameslink services between London and
Gatwick; and GNER and WAGN between London and Peterborough.  These
competitive battles have involved product differentiation, service frequency increases
and selective fares cuts.
3. Substantial on-the-track competition is feasible but is unlikely to be desirable. Our
simulation work suggests that frequency enhancements in the peak are likely to be the
most common competitive outcome (Preston et al., 1999).  This outcome is referred
to as cream skimming (also know as cherry picking).  Although passengers benefit,
operators lose out essentially as a result of providing too much service at too high a
price - a classic outcome of oligopolistic competition, which has also been observed
in the bus industry.  The ability to price discriminate may also be much reduced.
Overall, economic welfare reduces unless (i) competition stimulates productive
efficiency gains or (ii) competition stimulates dynamic efficiency through improved
productivity.  It is possible that some forms of competition, particularly involving
product differentiation, can lead to these two types of  efficiency gain.
4. Off-the-track competition was substantial.  Passenger railways were franchised to the
private sector by OPRAF between February 1996 and March 1997.  Franchising can
be done quickly if the political will is there. In this first round, there was an average
of 5 serious bids for each of the 25 TOCs, even with the constraint that the publicly
owned incumbent (BRB) could only be a bidder of last resort.  In the event, BRB was
not permitted to bid.  A key issue is whether this level of competitive activity may be
maintained in the second round in 2003.
5. Off-the-track competition intensified in later tranches.  The subsidy required for a
franchise was £18m p.a. lower in the 10th tranche than in the first tranche.  This
represented a 27% subsidy reduction or put another way a 27% increase in the bid
price.  The converse of this is that companies that got in first (Stagecoach, GNER,
First Great Western) are making substantial profits. There are parallels with the
privatisation of the National Bus Company where the first subsidiaries to be sold
were so at a price favourable to the purchaser. The policy of having a series of
franchise tranches was vindicated in that reasonable prices were eventually achieved.
A challenge for the future may be  to avoid the bunching of renewals at seven year
intervals and have a more regular spread of contract renewals.
36. Off-the-track competition was dependent on the liberalised bus and coach markets.
Fifteen out of the 25 TOCs went to bus companies (who have subsequently gained 3
more).  Each franchise had at least 2 bids from bus companies.
7. Management Buy Outs (MBOs) were relatively unsuccessful. They only won four
franchises.  All have subsequently been sold on suggesting that, in the British context
at least, MBOs are an ephemeral organisational form. This phenomenon has also been
observed in the bus industry (see, for example, Wright et al., 1992).
8. Agglomeration occurred almost straight away.  Four groupings (National Express
Group, Connex, Stagecoach/Virgin Trains and First Group) control 70% of revenue.
Does this mean that British Rail was split into too many passenger train operating
units?  Not necessarily so. One lesson might be that if you are to horizontally separate
a business it may be sensible to err on the side of too many, small units.  The market
can then put the units back together in the most optimal manner.  The parallels with
the bus industry should be obvious.  Econometric work we have undertaken suggests
that, in order to minimise operating costs, the optimal number of passenger and
freight  network operators in Great Britain is around six, although traffic density is
about right (Shires and Preston, 1999). For Denmark, we also find that traffic density
is about right, but the network size is insufficient to support one  network operator
(although there may be scope for many line operators, including the 13 private
railways already in existence). In the (very) long run mergers with adjacent networks
in Germany and Sweden might be considered.
9. Off-track competition appears to be effective in that subsidy is forecast to reduce
substantially.  Total subsidy is forecast to reduce from around £1.9b in the first year
of franchising to £0.5b in the final year of the first round.  However, we estimate that
in 1998/99 the industry was off target by around £100m. Currently, two TOCs are
operating without profit. Eventually 10 TOCs are forecast to do so, most
spectacularly Virgin West Coast.
10. The financial picture is difficult to assess. In 1993/4 (the last financial year before the
reforms) the passenger TOCs received £0.55b in direct revenue subsidy (BRB, 1994)
but  there were also :
• Additional subsidies related to capital grants and grants towards the operation and
maintenance of level crossings which could amount to as much as £0.54b per
annum.
• Change in accounting conventions from current replacement cost of renewed
assets to modern equivalent asset valuation of all assets increased the railways
capital costs by around 25%. This too may  represent around £0.54b per annum.
• If the receipts of the privatisation sales are amortised over, say, a 30 year period
they represent a substantial sum (around £0.3b per annum).
These points explain most of the difference between the pre and post privatisation
subsidy levels, although it should be no surprise that different authors draw different
conclusions.  Harris and Godward (1997) conclude that privatisation has led to a
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An unresolved issue is the size of the transitional costs.
11. A commercial open access network with a complementary social network may
emerge.  The chief architect of the railway reforms, Sir Christopher Foster, saw a two
tier railway network emerging (Foster, 1994). We seem to be on target for this
occurring in 2003.  The passenger rail industry will then be structured in a similar
manner to the local bus and coach industry in Britain (outside London), but with
much greater fare regulation.
12. Franchises could have been better specified.  Modelling work we have undertaken
suggests that 12 year, loosely regulated franchises could have reduced the subsidy bill
by 20%.  Removing exclusivity (i.e. protection from open access) is forecast to
increase the subsidy bill by 10% (Whelan et al., 1998). Some TOCs run services in
areas where a Passenger Transport Authority takes the revenue risk and in areas
where the train operating company itself takes the risk.  In all cases, revenue growth
has been substantially higher in the latter cases.  There has been a renewed interest in
micro-franchises, particularly for rural branch lines.  It is possible that a second round
of franchises may involve the subcontracting of such lines.
13. One of the aims of the privatisation was to raise money for the Exchequer.  The
reforms were successful in this, raising £4.4b in revenue. Rail privatisation was the
biggest of the UK transport privatisations.  With a certain amount of ingenuity, the
railway business can be re-structured so as to have profitable elements.
14. The creation of the ROSCOs removed an important barrier to entry.  Due to the
creation of the three ROSCOs, access to rolling stock has not been a major problem.
According to the TOCs, the main problems with ROSCOs revolve around the high
charges, the reluctance to provide new rolling stock and poor performance with
respect to maintenance etc. The lack of incentivisation may have been an oversight as
may the lack of claw-back provisions.  The ROSCOs were initially sold for £1.7b, but
were subsequently sold on for around £2.7b, leading to the National Audit Office
concluding that this represented poor value for the taxpayer (NAO, 1998).
15. The performance of Railtrack has been mixed.  I should state here, straightaway, that
I am a vertical separation sceptic (see Preston, 1996).  My main concern, although not
the only one, regards investment.  Railtrack as a private monopoly has strong
incentives to increase prices and reduce output, and this has been reflected by its
reluctance to invest in the network.  The proposed solution is the new Railway Bill in
which regulations will be tightened to specify investment levels as part of Railtrack’s
operating license conditions and penalties will be increased. The problem is that this
may just force up Railtrack’s price of capital and lead to less investment than would
otherwise be the case.   Britain’s regulatory regime is also rather over dependent on
individual personalities.  The current regulator has made it clear that he will adopt a
tough stance (Winsor 1999).
We have at least avoided in Britain the alternative investment problem that might
result from a vertically separated but publicly owned track authority, that of the gold
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have worked well initially in encouraging Railtrack to improve its performance with
respect to the operation of the network, but there is concern that the regime is
working less well now.  In addition, a profit sharing agreement has been established
with Virgin with respect to the Passenger Upgrade II of the West Coast Main Line,
but there are concerns that this investment incentive scheme may be potentially anti-
competitive.
16. The headline statistics seem encouraging. One of the first casualties of a reform
process is consistent statistics. Nonetheless,  Table 1 shows that between 1993/4 and
1998/9, passenger kms went up by almost 16%.  Real receipts per passenger km went
up by 9%, although we estimate that one third of this increase is due to a shortening
of mean journey lengths. Improved revenue yield techniques may be responsible for
much of the latter.  There has been a proliferation of new ticket types, particularly on
competed routes (e.g. London – Birmingham).  Ticketing co-ordination has been
reduced but ORR ensures that some minimum standards are maintained (e.g. through
tickets available on all routes, concessions to certain groups protected etc.). We
estimate that train kms have increased by over 10% during this period.  This demand
increase is in line with what one might expect using conventional elasticities,
assuming no secular time trend. The industry has traditionally assumed a negative
time trend of around 1.5% per annum.
 (It should be clear that my comments on rail refer to the passenger industry.  Freight
tonne kms have gone up by 22% between 1993/4 and 1997/8, despite continued
restructuring of the UK economy.  Privatisation for the freight industry is much less
problematic - not least because the freight market is more perfectly competitive.  This
is not due to actual on-track competition (there is some but this is limited and
declining) but due to inter-modal and end product market competition.  For general
merchandise (e.g. through the Channel Tunnel), road is a fierce competitor.  For bulk
goods, competition in the end-product market is fierce (e.g. UK power station coal
replaced by foreign coal or by natural gas).
17. Customer expectations concerning quality appear to have increased. There has been
a lot of concern about punctuality (the percentage of trains x minutes late) and
reliability (the percentage of trains operated).  The truth is that these are little
changed.  Indeed, they are slightly improved, despite some recent deteriorations (see
Table 1). However, only one franchise (the Island Line) is deemed to have good
performance in terms of both reliability and punctuality (OPRAF, 1999).  Ironically,
this is the only vertically integrated franchise. The problem is that the public expected
dramatic improvements.  Complaints to the Central Rail Users’ Consultative
Committee (a passenger rail watch dog body) have more than doubled since 1996.
Complaints to operators are exceeding  one million per annum, and have increased by
8% over the last year (ORR, 1999). However, there are also increased incentives to
complain because of improved compensation, customer care phone lines and pre-
printed forms have made it easier to complain and recording of complaints has
improved.
618. There have been some important entrepreneurial initiatives. These are detailed in
Van de Velde et al. (1998). The most important concern ticketing (particularly
regarding group travel and bonus schemes) and distribution (especially telesales).
Some have been stimulated by the Regulator (e.g. the National Rail Enquiry Service)
and by OPRAF (Franchise Commitments).  The main initiatives in the future will be
related to new rolling stock, and particularly tilting trains which will be introduced
some 20 years after the abandonment of the APT project.    With new rolling stock,
there is likely to be further increases in service levels.  Passenger dividends, insisted
on by OPRAF when TOCs change ownership, have emphasised new services (e.g.
Oxford to Bristol) and bus-rail and bus-cycle integration.
The up-shot in terms of investment is shown by Table 2, but note the footnotes  and
that rolling stock investment was affected by the large Networker orders in the early
1990s  and  total investment by investments related to the Channel Tunnel and
Heathrow Express.  It is though apparent that there was a virtual freeze on rolling
stock investment at the time of franchising (1996/7) but a recovery appears to be
underway. Investment will be given a slight boost by the Rail Passenger Partnership
which will make available an additional £100 million  over three years (1999/2000 to
2001/2).
19. There have been substantial changes in staff levels and costs.  Rail staff numbers
declined by 48% between 1994 and 1998 but some of this is due to the
reclassification of staff from SIC 60.1.  Cost savings seem likely for the industry as a
whole but may be easier for Railtrack and the ROSCOs to achieve than the TOCs.
We estimate that over the last year, although the TOCs have exceeded their forecasts
for revenue growth, costs have increased slightly when reductions were being sought.
20. A complex regime has been made to work.  This has been a considerable achievement
in itself.  With respect to the further changes that are planned,  the Strategic Railway
Authority may have advantages in that passenger and freight planning will  integrated
and the objectives of the second round of franchising better articulated.  The main
areas of concern are the possible duplication, with the Rail Regulator, in controlling
Railtrack and conflicts between public interest, value for money and promoting
competition objectives.
I wish to conclude with two final questions. First, could the British regime have been
made better?  This depends on the counterfactual.  It does appear that in financial and
economic terms the new regime in 1999 is better than the old regime in 1994.  But would
it be better than the old regime would have been in 1999?  I have my doubts, and my
doubts revolve around Railtrack.  There may be a case for Railtrack being investigated by
the Competition Commission.  If Railtrack is found to be acting anti-competitively, one
option would be to split it up into its ten or so zones (akin to the AT&T baby bells) which
to some extent map onto the TOCs.  A market test could then be established for vertical
integration in the way that it has already been established for horizontal integration.
Secondly, what are the main implications for railway reforms in Denmark? Hylen (1999)
summarises these as follows.  First, a simple infrastructure access pricing system based
(presumably) on short run average variable costs (as a proxy for short run marginal
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crossings.  In Britain, access pricing is based on long run average total costs.  Nash
(1995) found that infrastructure charges per train km were nearly seven times greater in
Britain than  in Sweden (whose charges are likely to be similar to those proposed in
Denmark).  The scope for determining the ‘true’ costs of infrastructure seems to have
been missed. Secondly, open access for freight is to be introduced in 1999.  The
experience in Britain would seem to support this.  Thirdly, open access for commercial
passenger services  is to be permitted from 2000.  This is what Britain is working towards
in 2002. However, given the huge difference in infrastructure charges between Britain
and Denmark, one might expect the commercial sector to be proportionately bigger in
Denmark.  There may be a big risk of cream skimming competition which may not be in
the public interest. It may have been more sensible to limit passenger open access to
internatonal services. Fourthly, non commercial passenger services will eventually be
tendered but the plans for this seem rather timid – only 15% by 2003. Experience from
Britain suggests franchising works, although further liberalisation of the bus and coach
markets may be required before it works as well in Denmark.  My reading of  the British
experience would suggest that these tenders should be bigger than seem to be envisaged
(maybe only 4 or 5 for the entire network and with a relatively permissive stance with
respect to mergers).  They should perhaps also be longer than the five years proposed and
the scope for vertically integrated concessions considered (with the infrastructure leased
from Banestyrelsen).  It might be sensible to limit DSB to be the bidder of last resort,
allowing the company to focus on freight and international passenger services.  This
though is to be over critical.  Denmark is to be applauded for embracing rail reform.  The
proposed reforms should allow operating costs to be reduced and innovative services and
related products to be introduced. The proposals, being less complex, should also avoid
the substantial transitional costs that occurred in Britain.  However, they do seem
unnecessarily constrained by the spirit (rather than the letter) of European Union rail
policy.  They should not be seen as an end-state but as part of a process of policy
evolution which permits railways to play a more beneficial role in the economy.
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Table 1: Trends in the National Passenger Rail Industry Since Privatisation
1993/4 1998/9 % change
Passenger km (b) 30.4 35.1 +15.5
Passengers (m) 740 890 +20.3
Revenue
(£m, 1997/8 prices)
2414 3028 +25.4
Receipts per
passenger km (p)
7.9 8.6  +8.9
Punctuality
(% on time)
89.6 91.6  +2.2
Reliability
(% operated)
98.7 98.8  +1.0
Mean trip length
(km)
41.1 39.4  -4.1
Source: DETR, 1999.
Table 2: Investment in National Railways since Privatisation (£ million, 1998/9
prices)
Rolling Stock Other Total
1993/4  464  839 1303
1994/5  391  965 1356
1995/6  211  950 1161
1996/7    48 1208 1256
1997/8  114 1430 1544
Notes:
Excludes PTE investments.
Affected by definitional changes in 1994/5 and 1996/7.
Source: DETR, 1999.
